INTRODUCTION
These two units lost almost two hundred armored vehicles and suffered more than 2,000
casualties. It took the Russians three more weeks to secure their initial objectives and more than eight weeks before they considered the city secure. In a simulation of the urban combat in Grozny, the situation can be replicated to mirror actual events. Modified variables are introduced after developing a satisfactory control scenario. These modifications are used to test subjectively drawn conclusions of the battle. The subjective conclusions include the idea that the Russians were poorly trained and improperly organized for urban combat in Grozny. By comparing the new outcomes of the simulated battle, the experiments suggest what changes the Russians needed in their organization to fight successfully in Grozny. Further analysis of those tested conclusions lead to the findings of this paper. Russian forces assaulting the city needed to change substantially their organization during the initial assault.
METHODOLOGY
This monograph is an examination of the tactical application of armored forces in To frame the study and set the conditions for analyzing the results of the simulations, it was necessary to first examine the available historical information to understand the events leading to the combat in Grozny. Second, from the information thus gained, the scenario and the conduct of the simulation were designed. Testing the In the other iterations, the effect of changing different tactical variables was tested. The first variable modified was the level of training of the Russian forces, since the majority of the soldiers within the employed forces lacked adequate basic and urban training. The conscript forces had received no urban combat training prior to deploying to Grozny. The major units involved had not conducted an exercise above battalion level in over two years.
Next, several sources criticize the Russian forces for not using more dismounted infantry to protect the armored formations. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The roots of the Russian-Chechen conflict stretch back several hundred years.
For the purpose of the simulation, only recent events within five years of the conflict are examined to provide an understanding of the situation. What followed was a military disaster.
The Russian mission was simply to "…go into the city, and then take the major buildings and hold them for the Interior Ministry troops to come in and take over."
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The Russian operational concept was to approach Grozny along three main avenues, from Confusion reigned during the initial stages of the operation. Military leaders refused to obey orders and submitted letters of resignation in protest to an operation they considered illegal. 28 Units deployed without adequate training and supplies. One Russian general described the lack of preparation as criminal. 29 The troops that deployed to the region were young, poorly led conscripted soldiers. "It's better for us in the dark and in the city. Here, they're our guests and we're the hosts. They have come in, but they won't leave…They're not fighting for anything, but we're fighting for our homeland -we're not afraid to die. They have planes and tanks and all we have is Allah and the RPG. But we know what we're fighting for." The boldness of the Russian armored drive into the city on the morning of 31
December surprised the Chechens and initially they reacted slowly. This was one portion of the Russian plan that worked well. The Chechens did not expect the Russians to attack the city center so abruptly. It was also New Years Eve and Dudayev believed a deliberate attack would not start until after the holiday. 38 Initially the Chechens were confused and unsure of how to respond. But by 1 P.M. they responded in full force and attacked both columns.
The Russians drove into the city unprepared for urban combat and unaware of the resistance that awaited them. "The armored columns…were most often stopped by knocking out the first and last armored vehicles. Afterwards, the combat vehicles stuck in the middle were fired at from the surrounding buildings, knocked out, and set on fire. Those (vehicles) unable to break out from the columns then began breaking into the adjoining concrete buildings by smashing through them in reverse…But the major portion of the armored vehicles were either knocked out immediately or forced to fight while encircled and without any hope of breaking out." "According to the participants in the battle, a grenade launcher antitank shell then knocked out the column's command vehicle and the column lost any effective command. The tank immediately lit up like a torch…Each of the group's armored personnel carriers was pierced by at least five antitank grenades…Only two tanks were able to break out…The rest…kept burning and crashing in to each other in the confusion." 45 Later that day, after two relief efforts from different units had failed to relieve the remnants of the 131st MRB, COL Savin decided to attempt a breakout. The first attempt 44 Gall & de Waal, 8 . 45 Knezys & Sedlickas, 101. The software editor generated irregular guerrilla forces based on Afghanistan Mujahadeen fighters. Chechen forces were organized and equipped as snipers, guerrilla squad-sized elements, and anti-tank infantry-RPG teams from these simulated forces found in the software editor. The anti-tank RPG teams were essential for the simulation design because these groups destroyed most of the Russian vehicles. The simulation replicated many of the limiting factors of the original battle to remain as realistic as possible. Armored vehicles drove through buildings but the structure slowed their progress and they risked immobilization on a random basis. The larger and heavier the vehicle, such as a tank, the more likely it moved successfully through a building. Lighter vehicles, such as the BTR, suffered immobilization when attempting to drive through a building. Units had a limited amount of ammunition per turn and also per iteration. As an example, each RPG team had a total of six warheads; once fired they received no re-supply. Lieven, 117. battalions. For simulation purposes and ease of controlling computer-generated forces, the engagement iterations fought between these units were run separately.
DEFINING THE EXPERIMENT
In designing the control iterations, Russian forces were placed on the city map where they were prior to their engagement based upon the research of the battle. 
OBSERVATION OF MODIFIED ITERATIONS
With the establishment of two control scenarios for comparison, the modified variables were introduced to test the effect on the outcome of the simulation. These variables include more dismounted infantry, an increase in Russian training proficiency, a combination of the two, and a training increase beyond the Chechen's value. The only change to the scenario will be the new variable. All other conditions remain the same.
The first modified variable tested was an increase in the number of Russian However, the extra infantry provide no additional advantage to the 81 st MRR because it was moving when attacked and, therefore, the infantry remained mounted until engaged. Once a vehicle was engaged, the troops were usually exposed and unable to find cover and concealment. Consequently, adding infantry did little to improve protection for the column during the approach to the Presidential Palace. The training proficiency of Russian forces was altered using the scenario editor.
To test the impact of training, the Russian's training values in the order of battle were In the combination iteration the 131 st MRB was trained as well as the Chechens and had an infantry squad in every APC. The squads dismounted and provided local security for their APC as well as nearby tanks as was done before in the increase infantry iteration. In this engagement the Chechens again seized the rail station but the relief column almost succeeded in reaching the rail station using their intended route of march.
The Russians killed all the Chechen snipers and half of the thirty RPG teams yet still lost the rail station. The close nature of the terrain, their initial force disposition around the rail station and the numerous Chechen dismounted infantry simply overwhelmed the force in this iteration. Clearly this iteration demonstrates the necessity for the protection of armored formations with dismounted infantry to provide security. In this simulation, even armored forces superior in training to their enemy required dismounted security to achieve successful results. 2) Armored forces require dismounted security. There is no set number of infantrymen to tank ratio, but a balance is required between firepower and security. Tanks cannot operate without infantry nor can the infantry fight without tanks in an urban environment.
DATA COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS
The streets canalized the simulated forces. Both the Russian and Chechen forces experienced this problem. Long streets under observation or occupation were death traps while the narrow passages and streets between buildings and movement through buildings provided complete cover and concealment. In urban combat, streets are true danger zones. Most of the Russian casualties in Grozny occurred in the streets. The
Chechens prepared holes in walls so they could travel laterally up city blocks without exposing themselves outside of the building.
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Dismounted security is essential. Armored forces in an urban fight are at a distinct disadvantage because they must fight at close ranges and against anti-tank weapons fired from above. Dismounted infantry can spot and suppress these dangerous elements before they fire. In the simulation as in the actual battle, many of the infantry teams died because they remained mounted in the vehicles while in contact with enemy forces. There is a point in an engagement when the infantry must dismount and provide security forward of the vehicle, while remaining close enough to maintain mutually supporting fires. There is a delicate balance between remaining mobile and remaining under armor protection.
A small force, squad sized with RPG teams could prevent an armored column from moving down a street. If the lead vehicles were destroyed and the vehicles maintained a close march interval, the column was usually decisively engaged and unable to maneuver. The buildings and narrow streets compounded the problem by restricting and preventing vehicle movement. Once committed down a street, it is difficult to turn an armored column around, especially under fire. This can lead to the "wandering" column, similar to what happened with the relief column of the 131 st MRB.
The concentric rings of defense gave the Chechens the ability to reposition forces along interior lines. They defended the city from three directions with the focal point being the Presidential Palace. As the Russians attempted to penetrate the rings, the Chechens repositioned forces easier within a circular defensive scheme.
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CONCLUSION
This computer simulation recreated the important elements in the initial battle for
Grozny. While not an exact duplicate the factors that affected the outcome were present.
The constricted nature of urban terrain, the number and types of weapons systems involved, and the ferocity of close combat all contributed in creating a near reproduction of the New Years battle. This replication permitted the testing of several subjective assessments of errors committed by Russian forces to determine their validity.
What the simulation suggests is that unless the Russians had deployed with bettertrained soldiers, used dismounted infantry to secure their vehicles, and used a more methodical approach in assaulting the city block by block, it is unlikely the initial assault forces would have succeeded. The only successful simulated iteration involved Russian forces that had a level of training twice as high as the Chechens, in addition to proper local dismounted security. The combination of well-trained armored crews and dismounted security enabled the Russians to retain one of their objectives. In other iterations, no modification could overcome the poor tactical application of armored forces in an urban environment.
It is doubtful the Russians could have deployed the required forces into Grozny, Chechnya in December 1994. Based on the political and military events leading to the battle, the Russian government was unable to deploy trained troops to the region. The poorly conceived and executed plan to storm Grozny, based on prior successes in different political and military situations, had no chance for success. In addition, the Russians grossly underestimated Chechen resistance. All these factors contributed to the Russian defeat in Grozny. Urban combat is the most challenging combat environment requiring extraordinary preparations to ensure success.
The Russians may have achieved success in their initial battle if the two other assault groups from the East and West had been able to penetrate to the center of the city and they overwhelmed the Chechens with numbers. But casualties most likely would have been very high and it is questionable as to whether they could have sustained those forces in the city without secure lines of communications. The Russians ignored the urban combat lessons they learned years before.
Urban combat is fought at close ranges; visibility is often reduced to less than one hundred meters. Casualties are extremely high, physical as well as psychological, as soldiers can only endure the rigors of combat operations in urban terrain for a limited period of time. Throughout history urban fighting has been a difficult, costly affair. In the face of mounting possibilities for future urban combat, it is time to heed the lessons discovered time and time again by forces in urban combat, paid for by the blood of soldiers.
